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QUALITY CONTROL AND NONDESTRUCTIVE TESTING 
FOR THE PREVENTION OF FAILURES 
IN SCIENTIFIC SATELLITES’ 
2 
by Alfred J .  Babecki 
t 
I 
The Role of the Contractor 
The primary purpose of t h i s  paper i s  to help inculcate in the minds of al l  who are 
engaged in the space program a greater feeling of responsibility for the production 
of a first-class product. You may be surprised at this statement, and some of you 
no doubt are saying that you already are trying your b e s t  to produce a first-class 
product. However, experience indicates that a large number of the components and 
structures and finishes going into space hardware are not first-class simply because of 
poor workmanship and improper material selection. 
j -  
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The reasons for the lack of performance of these components are primarily two in 
number. First, the prime contractor and the major sub contractors do not make 
adequate use of their own materials and processes experts during the materials-selec- 
tion and specificationwriting phases. These trained metallurgists, ceramists, chemist! 
etc. are usually asked by the design engineers to approve a major materials l i sv  which 
does not include many of the small items, such as fasteners, and which ,does not descril 
the detailed geometry cand service environment of the parts to be made from these mate 
rials. With what l i tt le information i s  given him, the materials man says that, in gener 
this and that material i s  adequate or suitable. Of course, the fact that welding may 
make a particular aluminum alloy unsuitable for a specific application i s  not considere 
because, at the time, the method of fabrication has not been decided upon. 
1. Paper submitted to the Sixth National SAMPE Symposium, Seattle, Washington, 
November 18-20, 1963. 
2. Aerospace Technologist of structural materials in the Materials Research ahd 
Development Section, Spacecraft Systems and Projects Division, Goddard Space 
Flight Center, Greenbelt, Md. 
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The point i s  that many contractors do not assign materials people to the project to 
I 
nd 
1 of 
remain in close contact with it. In many cases i t  i s  only after a particular component 
fails in testing that the materials people are consulted. By that time, many thousands 
of dollars of man-hours have gone into the design and fabrication of the component, 
and the completion schedule has slipped by weeks and possibly months. Oftentimes 
the materials investigation reveals, for example, a design deficiency, the use of an 
improper heat treatment or fabrication process, an inadequate surface coating, or an 
unsuitable material. These costly errors could be avoided in moqt cases with early 
and continued use of qualified materials experts. 
6 
I 
Secondly, the major contractors do not exert adequate non-destructive testing and 
quality control procedures over the manufacture of the components. This i s  especially 
true for those components which are procured from numerous small vendors. These 
small production shops, in many instances, are too small to be able to afford radio- 
graphic, fluorescent penetrant, or other nondestructive testing facilities. Conse- 
quently, many small items are delivered which have undetected flaws but which 
become evident after the component has failed in pressurization or vibration testing. 
These small concerns also may  not have a quality control department which would 
help ensure the reliability of the product. 
Accordingly, i t  behooves the maior contractors to establish materials and processes 
standards and specifications for al l  items under their cognizance, not only those manu- 
factured in-house, but also those procured from other manufacturers. A rigorous inspec- 
tion of these incoming items also should be standard operating procedure. This inspec- 
tion should be more than a visual examination by the receiving-room personnel, 
especially i f  the item did not have to meet rigid qualifications at the point of manu- 
facture. For many materials, the oft-quoted military or federal specifications are not 
adequate to assure reliability in a piece of spacecraft hardware; consequently, specifi- 
cations with tighter controls are required. It i s  understood that NASA is  in the process 
of formulating these specifications. But in the meantime, the contractors themselves 
can exert greater control over the quality of the spacecraft hardware. 
1 
I 
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The f i r s t  step forward in t h i s  quality improvement program should be an education 
and constant reminder to al l  those involved that the items of spacecraft hardware 
are not ordinary nuts and bolts, glue and wire; but that they are part of an ex- 
pensive and intricate precision apparatus which wi l l  be placed in a service where 
minor defects may jeopardize the success of the mult imil l ion dollar effort. It i s  
amazing how a well-informed and interested technician with pride in his work can 
discover irregularities in the quality of the hardware he handles or assembles. A 
simple tool scratch or dent on the surface of a high-strength pressure vessel or bolt, 
i f  undetected or considered unimportant, can and, indeed, has caused catastrophic 
rupture. Later on a number of such detectable defects which have led to failures. 
wi l l  be discussed. Suffice it to say here that a f&kwelI hardness impression im- 
properly placed on a high-strength (and notch sensitive) steel band between third 
stage and payload caused a delayed failure while the vehicle was being readied 
for launch. 
The repnsib i l i ty  of the contractor in the production of a first-class product, as 
. 
, 
discussed above, i s  not related to any one project. The same responsibilities exist 
in the manned as well as in the unmanned space program. It can be said, however, 
that the manned program appears to have more of this contractor esprit de corps than 
does the unmanned program. This i s  undoubtedly due to the interjection of the 
human-life element into the reliability picture and also to the greater publicity 
accorded the manned shoots. 
The unmanned scientific satellites are of a large variety and, therefore, of a small 
number of each individual type. This difference between the Mercury and the 
scientific satellites no doubt has much to do with the interest developed by the 
contractors and their employees. In the latter case, only three to five spacecraft, . 
including engineering and prototype models, may be produced, and the program may 
last an average of only one to three years, depending in part upon the number of 
materials problems encountered. While no human l i fe i s  involved in scientific 
satellite launches, the aim of the NASA in each case i s  to obtain a completely re- 
liable spacecraft. This should be a joint goal of both the space agency and the 
contractor. 
-- 
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.This discussion, although it applies in principle to al l  sQace activities, i s  specifically 
related to the prevention of failures in the unmanned scientific satellite programs which 
are under the sponsorship o f  the Goddard Space Flight Center. . 
Definition of a Scientific Satellite 
In this discussion a scientific satellite i s  defined as an unmanned object placed into 
orbit about the earth or any heavenly body in  our solar system, including the sun, 
which incorporates equipment or means by which scientific experiments can be carried 
out. In the case of the passive communications satellite, Echo I, this means consisted 
principally of a surface highly rettective to both radio and light waves. Although small 
wafer beacon transmitters were attached to the skin to aid in locating the satelloon, as 
i t  was called, Echo I had no instrumentation to gather information and send it back IO 
earth. It was a relatively simple satellite to make from the standpoint of quality control . 
M o s t  scientific satellites do have instrumentation on board which i s  designed to perform 
experiments aimed at gathering specific information abolrt the space environment (such 
as radiation belts), about our own planet (such as cloud patterns), about other planets 
(such as the temperature of Venus), or about our sun (such as sun spot activity). Some 
satellites may be developed to perform only one experiment or activity, such as Tiros, 
our present weather satellite; others may be equipped to conduct several experiments 
separately or simultaneously, such as the Orbiting Solar Observatory. 
There i s  a great variety in the design, materials, and fabrication of these satellites. 
Of course, some satellites, such as Tiros may actually consist of several similar space- 
crafts launched at different times. But, by and large, each satellite i s  an individual 
one which must be custom-made. It may have among i t s  thousands of parts some which 
are mass-produced, off-the-shelf items, but the assembly of these, and the many 
specially-made items, i s  essentially a hand operation 
The Goddard Mission 
The Goddard Space Flight Center, established in 1959, i s  charged with the responsi- 
bil i ty of the investigation and exploration of space for peaceful purposes by use of un- 
manned scientific satellites, probes, and rockets. I t s  scientists conceive and design the 
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scientific experiments, sometimes in conjunction with other scientific organizations. 
They usually provide the basic design of the spacecraft which wi l l  carry the experi- 
ments. When the fabrication of the spacecraft and instrumentation i s  left to outside 
contractors, the scientific personnel monitor the contract to expedite i t s  completion, 
to pass judgment on necessary design or material changes, and to help coordinate the 
efforts of the many subcontractors, the producer of the launch vehicle, and the launch 
site. 
The Goddard Space Flight Center, which was named after Dr. bbert  H. Goddard, 
American pioneer in rocketry, also has considerable fabrication and testing facilities 
of i t s  own. These are used primarily for in-house manufacture of research apparatus 
and development models of experimental equipment. However, the Center has also 
built, integrated, and tested a few satellites itself. 
Another very important function of the center's i s  that of operating the world-wide 
tracking and communications network stations which trace the flight of the wteIlites, 
and which accumulate and reduce the data they develop. 
Goddard i s  one of the few installations in the world capable of conducting a full-range 
space-science experimentation program -- from theory, through experiment design and 
construction, satellite fabrication and testing, rocket launch, tracking, data acquisi- 
.A 
tion, and data reduction. 
Besides i t s  efforts in the study of weather and world-wide communications, the Goddard 
Center has pioneered the study of cislunar space, that space which lies between the 
earth and the moon, for the benefit of our man-in-space Mercury, Gemini, and ApoIlo 
programs. These studies detected the presence, the intensities, and the extent of the 
radiation belts surrounding the Earth . Although the emphasis on our manned space 
program has eclipsed, in a way, our unmanned program, i t  should be pointed out that 
our scientific satellites and probes remain our most important means, at the moment, of 
exploring our solar system. And, though they do not get the newspaper and television 
coverage accorded our manned shots, the conception, design, and fabrication of the un 
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manned scientific satellites continue as fast as economics and the state of the art 
wi l l  allow. 
Need for Reliability 
Every failure of one of these scientific satellites in achieving i t s  mission i s  an ex- 
tremely costly affair in dollars and time. Hopefully, even if a satellite does fai l  
in i t s  mission, we do learn something which i s  of value in a subsequent attempt. 
However, the amount of money involved in the launch attempt of one of these 
satellites, including the cost of launch vehicle, runs into the millions of dollars. 
Accordingly, every attempt must be made to obtain a reliabilify as near to 100 per 
cent as i s  practical. 
The demand for levels of quality i s  almost unbelievable in the space industry; however, 
it i s  necessary. For example, there may be more than 300,000 parts in any one 
satellite launch unit, i.e. launch vehicle and satellite. Even if a reliability of 
99.99% i s  maintained, i t  has been stated that only three launches in 100 wil l  
function perfectly in al l  respects. 
. 
In the Mercury space program, a l l  spacecraft capsules were essentially similar in 
design and materials of construction. Consequently, reliability was able to improve 
with each orbital flight as a result of natural development and the suggestions of the 
astronauts. In addition, one could say that because of the human life involved in  
the program, greater quality control was exercised consciously and unconsciously over 
al l  systems than might be exercised in the case of the unmanned program. Every person 
working on the Mercury components had a personal interest in doing a good job. 
9- 
The same need of quality also exists in the scientific satellite program, because we 
cannot practically return to Earth a malfunctioning spacecraft to correct i t s  defective 
component. In the case of such a malfunction, we generally can only guess as to i t s  
cause. For example, Syncom I, our intended synchmnous-orbiting communications 
satellite which was launched in February of t h i s  year, became lost several hours after 
launch. I t s  power failed completely for some reason s t i l l  not definitely established. 
' . 
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The Bell Telephone Company's Telstar I active communications satellite also became 
mute after about four months operation. In this case, however, the cause of the 
trouble was determined by a reconstruction in the laboratory of the satellite's elec- 
tronics, which duplicated the malfunction and identified the defective unit os a 
transistor in  the command decoder. Corrective action was possible in t h i s  case becam 
of redundant systems. 
Another, more subtle, reason why high quality i s  desired in scientific satellite hard- 
ware i s  simply that we want to be sure that the information<the satellite gathers i s  
correct. If, for instance, an optical lens on a piece of equipment has an impurity 
in it which, with time and exposure to ultra-violet, 'electronics, or other radiation 
causes a change in  transmissivity, the data acquired through that lens could possibly 
be in error. Nondestructive tests for such cases are generally non-existent, primarily 
because i t  i s  almost impossible to know before hand and in exact detail al l  the en- 
vironmental conditions that each part of the spacecraft wi l l  see. We do have m e  
idea of these environments, and additional knowledge about them is  constantly be- 
ing acquired. The nondestructive testing state-of-the-art need only keep up with 
the space environment state-of-knowledge . 
. .  
How to Achieve Better Reliability 
How can the reliability of the satellite components be increased? Well, certainly 
better assurance of good quality i s  obtained when a l l  items installed on the space- 
craft have been previously adequately examined, as opposed to the case where the 
lot from which they were selected was only spot checked by examination of a few 
randomly-selected samples.' .In the fabrication of space-flight hardware, where 
100% reliability i s  desired, one would think that a l l  items would be examined 100%. 
T h i s  i s  not the case at the moment in the manufacture of scientific satellites. Many 
parts are standard stock items which have been produced primarily for use in an earthly 
environment. In many instances, the people responsible for the selection of materiars 
-
-
are not aware of the effects the space environment may have on the materials which 
might render them useless or even harmful to the spacecraft's mission. As an example, 
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many contractors are s t i l l  using cadmium-plated hardware in  satellites designed for 
vacua of 10 
This i s  one reason why subsystems and each fully-integrated spacecraft must undergo 
a vacuum exposure test prior to qualification. 
-9 
torr or lower, despite the Goddard directive not to use cadmium. 
Another means of increasing the reliability of the satellites would be the establishment 
of an industrywide set of material and component specifications which are specially 
prepared for spacecraft hardware. Up to now, NASA does not have such specifications 
h 
and has, therefore, relied on individual vendors standards, some of which are less 
elaborate than others. In many instances, even vendor specifications do not exist be- 
cause i t  i s  assumed that the subject hardware w i l l  serve adequately since it, or another 
similar to it, has done so in other applications here on Earth. NASA i s  presently pre- 
e.- b- 
paring design criteria which hopefully wi l l  serve both government and industry designers 
as standards for the selection of testing techniques and materials with the aim of in- 
creasing both the quality and the reliability of al l  satellite components. 
The nondestructive testing industry itself could do much to improve the situation by 
taking a greater interest in the problem. It appears that up to the present time the 
spacecraft manufacturers have held the initiative in pushing for new and improved non- 
destructive testing techniques, principally because they are closer to the problems. 
These manufacturers, whether they be government or industry, would certainly welcome 
the testing industry's assistance, especially if the manufacturer i s  new in the business. 
~ 
I 
I 
Problems of Satellite Variety 
Earlier some of the many satellites for which Goddard i s  responsible were mentioned. 
Each one i s  quite different from the other and, .therefore, must be custom-made. This I 
kind of fabrication i s  not conducive to good quality control because, in  most cases, 
the number of items is  too small to warrant a large expenditure for expensive nondestructive 
testing equipment or for a staff of quality control engineers. The contractor did not in- 
clude an adequate estimate for such work in his proposal in many cases because, for one 
reason, he did not know a l l  of the problems he might encounter. Consequently, as 
fabrication and integration proceeds additional money must be granted for material 
testing and development as i s  indicated by component failures. 
I 
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Also, fie variety of contractors building the satellite hardware i s  almost as great 
as the variety of satellites themselves. Some contractors have been in the aerospace 
business for a long time; others have formed aerospace divisions in their diversification 
process; s t i l l  others have just recently sprung into existence. The amount of experience 
in the business of these companies varies greatly. Consequently, problems encountered 
by one manufacturer are invariably encountered by another. One of the principal un- 
official functions of the &ddat-d liaison engineers i s  that of passing information de- 
veloped by one contractor on NASA funds to another so that the second might avoid 
the pitfalls of the first. Some of the information developed by contractors, especially 
on the subject of outgassing characteristics of materials in vacuum, i s  used by them to 
select the materials for the spacecraft systems, and then t h i s  information may lie un- 
published in company files, requiring another contractor contemplating use of the same 
material, to run his own outgassing studies. There i s  certainly a need for al l  this infor- 
mation to be funnelled to a single repository from which it can be made available to 
others. 
Unfortunately, many of the materials or processing techniques that must be used on 
satellites at this point are proprietary in nature, and the relevant company may not 
willingly release information concerning i t s  details of-manufacture or even of testing. 
Such i s  the case with some thermal control coatings and solidfilm lubricants. 
The variety of spacecraft problems encountered i s  not only a result of the variety of 
materials and devices occasioned by the variety of satellites, but i t  i s  also a result 
of the variety of space environments the spacecrafts see. Some satellites orbit near 
the Earth, within a hundred or two hundred miles in a circular fashion. In t h i s  case, 
the radiation exposure may vary, but the vacuum would be quite constant. Other 
satellites may be in circular orbits at much higher altitudes, where both the radia- 
tion and vacuum and other effects are different than the first. S t i l l  other satellites 
may be placed into elliptical orbits with apogees thousands of miles high and perigees 
only a hundred or so miles high. In such cases, a l l  space conditions are everchanging. 
Accordingly, i t i s  logical that some materials or devices may be suitable for some space 
craft but not for others. 
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Some idea of the variety of spacecraft shapes that are under Gaddard's sponsorship 
may be had from a study of Figures 1 and 2. Pictured in the artist's drawing of Figure 
1 are those satellites which have already been launched. The largest of these i s  the 
100 ft. dia. Echo I satelloon passive communications satellite which has been orbiting 
for more than three years. Most of these satellites, like the Explorer series, have 
been used to study the radiation and magnetic fields surrounding Earth. As can be 
seen, there was m e  variety even within t h i s  series of spacecraft. The Tiros series 
were essentially a l l  similar in  oufward appearance and were and are used, of course, 
to study the Earth's cloud cover. The Orbiting Solar Observatory(OSO), which was 
launched about a year ago, carried several experiments on board, a l l  aimed at either 
studying some aspect of the sun or else the effect of i t s  radiation on coatings. 
, 
In Figure 2 are pictured satellites which, in general, have not yet been launched. 
One of them, Syncom IA, was launched but, as was  mentioned earlier, i t s  power 
supply failed to function. A back-up Syncom satellite, IB, has been launched after 
'some changes, and i s  functioning successfully. Also pictured i s  Relay I which was 
successfully orbited last December and i s  an active communications satellite at a 
much lower altitude that the 22,000 mile orbit of Syncom. Relay has had some mal- 
functions in i t s  brief lifetime, but i s  s t i l l  operating to some degree. OAO, the 3,200 
Ib. Orbiting Astronomical Observatory i s  probably the largest shown in t h i s  figure with 
the exception of the advanced satellon, Rebound. The Rebound satellite, with a 
diameter of 135 ft, i s  an advanced Echo passive communications satellite. It i s  fabri- 
cated from a laminated aluminum-mylar-aluminum material rather than the very thin 
aluminized mylar used for Echo. This heavier material i s  designed to rigidire the structure 
in orbit, and thereby maintain i t s  shape over a longer period. Fabrication of this laminate 
has presented quality control problems which wi l l  be discussed later. Three such satellites, 
each weighing 600 Ib. are to be orbited from the same launch vehicle but uniformly 
spaced about tbe Earth in a 1500 mile high circular orbit. Nimbus i s  an advanced 
weather satellite, and OGO i s  the Orbiting Geophysical Observatory that can carry 
50 different experiments on a single mission. 
. 
_ _  -- 
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Factors Affecting Quality Control 
In this variety of satellite spacecrafts there are represented many different mdterials 
in many diverse forms, produced by practically every fabrication method known to 
man. Metal alloys, plastics, rubbers, glasses, solid state devices, ceramic and 
chemical coatings, gases, and liquids - al l  may be present on a single spacecraft. 
. 
These and other materials are produced by casting, forging, extrusion, rolling, 
stamping, welding, brazing, soldering, riveting, adhesive bonding and perhaps 
other processes as well. They are electroplated, flame sprayed, painted, chemical 
milled, vapor deposited, heat treated, high and low temperature cured, sintered, 
and irradiated. 
. 
With this variety of materials, processes, and treatments a l l  to be qualjty controlled 
for optimum reliability, it i s  understandable that the task i s  a formidable one. As 
pointed out earlier, the small numbers of items required in some cases negates against 
good quality control. Also, the hostile and l i t t le known'space environment in which 
these many materials and devices w i l l  operate make quality control difficult. What 
may be a good quality device for an earth-bound application, may not function re- 
liably or at al l  in space. 
We attempt to determine such possible problems by environmental tests in vacuum 
chambers under simulated solar energy conditions. Such tests can be termed non- 
destructive, i f  the device functions satisfactorily ., However, at best the vacuua we 
can achieve do not approach that of altitudes of more than 500 miles, and the simulated 
solar energy i s  just a close approximation of the actual sun's spectrum. In addition, the 
combined conditions of ultraviolet, electron, proton, and other radiations, as well as 
micrometeoric bombardment, cannot be duplicated here on earth. 
Another reason why quality control i s  sometimes difficult to achieve, especially in 
instrument packages, i s  that the state-of-the-art in  sensors, electronics packaging, 
solar cells, and others i s  advancing very rapidly in many small laboratories, and th i s  
advance i s  leading quality control by some margin. The reason for this i s  that these 
small organizations may not have any quality control group or adequate testing 
facilities. Their developmental problems are known only to themselves. Sometimes t h c ~  
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cannot identify the problem area and malfunctions show up only after assembly of 
the integrated instrument . 
However, i t  should be pointed out that a lot of non-destructive testing i s  being 
employed in satellite manufacture, especially by the larger contractors. These 
tests include most of the convertional techniques, such as radiography, magnetic 
and fluorescent particle, ultrasonic, strain gaging and strain sensitive coatings, and 
visual inspection with various aids. These are generally used on structural parts of 
the spacecraft at various stages of fabrication and testing . Other non-destructive 
tests include electrical performance tests of completed electronic modules, tran- 
m 
1- 
3 we 
irnul ated 
tion, the 
H e l l  as 
sistors, or solar cell arrays. These tests may indicate whether a part i s  defective or 
not, but oftentimes they cannot pinpoint the defective area. 
Obviously, in satellite manufacture we are dealing with some very small, but criti- 
cal, items. A power transistor may be only a fraction of an inch in size, and 
consequently difficult to examine, but i t may jeopardize the success of a several 
million-dollar mission. Frequently, i t  i s  cheaper to discard a defective device 
* 
f in . 
d t h i s  
these 
rather than attempt to repair it. To increase reliability in the electronics systems, 
most satellites are equipped with redundant systems. Hopefully, some day t h i s  
technique wil  I no longer be necessary. 
Typical Problem Areas 
The following are some examples of areas where problems have developed which 
could have been prevented by more adequate quality control and non-destructive 
testing It i s  true in some cases that the significance of a condition to good per- 
formance was not known until after failure occurred. In the case of the attempt 
to launch a second Echo satellite, motion pictures taken by a camera recovered from 
the launch vehicle showed that the balloon ripped open on inflation. In an attempt 
to determine why, the aluminized mylar and other balloon materials were subsequently 
examined. Briefly, what the study showed was that the - plastic films generally do have 
orientation stresses residual from the manufacturing process. These residual stresses re= 
times they 
- 13 - 
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I 
duce the ability of the plastic to take the rapid inflation stresses without tearing. 
low inflation rates, they fair better; so one approach i s  to regulate the ;ate of Subli- 
mation of the inflating chemical. 
Because the 0.5 mi l  thin aluminized mylar material used on Echo I was too flimsy fo 
maintain the balloon in  spherical shape over long periods of time, the more rigid 
laminate of 0.18 m i l  aluminum foil to 0.35 m i l  mylar to aluminum foil was specified 
for Echo II. In static inflation tests of full-size balloons at Lakehurst, New Jersey, 
ruptures occurred at lower-than-calculated pressures. Figure 3 shows one of these 
135 foot diameter balloons during the inflation tests. Examinations of the failed 
balloons disclosed a fold defect in the balloon material, shown in Figure 4. After 
the aluminum foil had been adhesively bonded to one side of the mylar, processing 
rolls introduced numerous narrow folds of various lengths just prior to the bonding of 
the aluminum foil on the opposite side. Inspection following processing was in+- 
to detect these folds shown in cross-section in Figure 5. Upon inflation of the balloon, 
the single thickness of aluminum foil at these defects was inadequate to sustain the 
load. At these points, consequently, the aluminum ruptured and induced a shock or 
impact load on the remaining foil-mylar laminate which caused the tupture of the 
bal loons . 
* 
Since many of the experiments on board the satellites, as well as star-trackers and 
sensors, may incorporate lens systems open to the radiations in space, these lenses 
must be checked for fluorescence under anticipated electron bombardment if such 
fluorescence would mask the incident energy and give erroneous results. Many con- 
tractors specify lens materials without checking their fluorescence tendencies. Con- 
sequently, some lens materials had to be rejected for t h i s  reason after fabrication. 
Figure 6 pictures a 7075-T6 aluminum panel from the OS0 spacecraft currently being 
built. This panel i s  typical of some which developed cracking at the inside bend 
radius during vibration testing as seen in Figure 7. A check of the panels at the 
spacecraft contractor disclosed that some were not heat treated, including those 
which developed cracking. The panel forming was performed by one vendor, the 
heat treatment by another. No rigid inspection was exercised on these panels at any 
point during manufacture . 
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In Figure 8 i s  pictured a section of a pressure welded titanium alloy bottle that w i l l  
contain nitrogen gas under pressure on t)le OS0 for attitude and spin control. This 
one was tested to destruction and failed at approximately 7800 psig, far above the ' 
3OOO psig pressure it wi l l  hold. However, the test was conducted with water at room 
temperature, whereas the bottle may see -%OF or less in space. It i s  known how a 
drop in test temperature of lW0F or so can change a ductile material into a brittle 
one. In addition, small defects in the pressureweld seam may gmdually grow under 
the stress of the internal pressure until it reaches a size large enough to initiate a 
catastrophic explosionrlike rupture long before the intended op-year service has 
been reached. Besides a lack of consideration of brittle frac6re possibilities, 
forgings from two different manufactures are sometimes welded together in the fabri- 
cation of these bottles. 4 
t 
Q-9, - 
M o s t  satellites have batteries for power to supplement a solar cell system e Shown in 
Figure 9 i s  a typical zinc-silver cell. The case i s  injection molded polystyrene. . .  
Several such cases cracked open in the laboratoiy m e  time after the electrolyte was 
added. When similar cases were observed through the polariscope, residual strain 
patterns were visible, as can be seen in Figure 10. These cases were not annealed 
after molding, and the manufacturer increased the capacity of his battery by forcing 
more plates into the same size case. These two conditions contributed to the cause 
of the failures. 
It has been known for many years now that certain metals, such as electroplates of 
zinc, tin, and cadmium, grow thin metal whiskers. When these platings were used on 
low-vol tage electronic components, they sometimes grew whiskers which created 
electrical short circuits. Many spacecraft component systems are fitted with electrical 
connectors, like the type shown in Figure 11. This multi-contact connector has a brass 
shell which i s  plated over with cadmium. A cross-section of t h i s  connector in the mated 
. 
condition i s  pictured in Figure 12. Here a space can be seen between the plastic inserts 
of both connector halves into which metal whiskers can grow and possibly make contact 
with one or more of h e  pins. Although the possibility of metal whisker growth being a 
problem in th is  case i s  remote, i t i s  one which can be eliminated by the use of connectors 
not plated with these metals, or by the use of an internal gasket to fill the void. In o m  
. 
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case, a spacecraft included a hundred or more of these cadmium-plated connectors, 
already potted or fastened in  place, when this fact became known at Goddard. 
Nickel-cadmium batteries used on board some spacecraft in general are a shck itern 
which are used in many earth-bound applications. Consequently, they are not manu- 
factured especially for spacecraft use and have been a continued source of trouble. In 
one instance, after vibration testing the voltage of the batteries was found to be de- 
graded. The battery was radiographed prior to destructive examination. The radiograph 
showed that the nickel oxide paste of the positive electrode developed crazing cracks 
during vibration which accounted for the voltage drop. The cracking was caused by 
the loose condition of the cells in the battery case. This was corrected by additional 
crimps in the case. 
Figure 13 shows the top sides of two solar cells. The solder contact strip along the top 
edges and the solder collector grids were a source of trouble in that occasionally they 
would peel during thermal cycling. This condition also occurred on the reverse side of 
the cell which i s  solder covered. The lack of bond strength between the silicon and a 
vapor deposited layer of titanium and silver (over which the solder i s  placed) was found 
to be the result of poor cleaning of the sandblasted silicon surface. Now chemical 
etching procedures are used to clean the surface prior to the vapor deposition. 
Most al l  active satellites have tape recorders on board, and they too are not free from 
problems. Many recorder heads are fully fabricated only to be rejected on final check- 
out. A study of the failures included radiographic inspection, as shown in Figure 14, 
and dissection. This investigation disclosed that a room temperature cure was being 
given to the epoxy-polystyrene potting material which, when exposed to the thermal 
vacuum test, probably developed additional cure and shrinkage enough to rupture one 
or more of the 2-mil diameter wires of the core windings. It was also noted that air 
was entrapped in the recorder head during the potting operation which no doubt added 
to the stressing developed on the wire. 
On the OGO satellite, an infra-red horizon scanner moves through a 4 5 O  arc on 
positor flexure pivots, such as the one pictured in Figure 15. This pivot assembly 
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consists of glass-epoxy laminate curved mounting sections which pivot through the 
copper-beryllium alloy springs.. The springs are only .002 inch thick, by .036 inch 
wide, by 1-1/2 inch long and are currently made of alloy 190 in the extra hard heat 
treated condition. As shown in the slide, the springs fracture during vibration testing 
of the scanner assembly. This device has developed failures for some time. Alloy 25 
was originally used in the springs, but they that had a poor surface condition and 
rough edges which caused failures. Other springs were susceptible to stress corrosion 
cracking caused by ammonium hydroxide in  the solder flux that was used. Care wos 
not taken in the application of the flux and some of it found i t s  way to the spring 
center sections which were not cleaned off, an example of poor quality control. Now 
the springs are examined stereoscopically for surface condition. The Kodak photo- 
resist method i s  used to trim the springs to size and eliminate the bad edge condition, 
and then the springs are electropolished to a smoothness of less than 5 microinches. 
Figure 16 shows a transistor, such as that used on our Relay satellite. It wi l l  be re- 
called that t h i s  satellite functioned sporadically soon after launch and this transistor 
was suspected. A switch to a redundant circuit, which by-passed the defective tran- 
sistor, permitted successful operation. In the manufacture of this hermetically sealed 
transistor, dry air with dew-point below -%OF i s  introduced into the can. However, 
iporadic operation of the transistors was noted during laboratory tests, especially during 
thermal cycling. This condition was traced to the existence of leaks in the cans which 
permitted moisture to enter. Condensation at low temperatures then occurred across the 
circular contacts on the interior of the can seen in Figure 17. At higher temperatures, 
the condensed moisture f i lm evaporated and thus permitted the sporadic operation. 
Another hermetically sealed transistor developed malfunction after a storage test at 
200°C for 168 hours. After vibration testing i t  returned to normal operation. Sub- 
sequent opening of this unit discbsed a loose flake of solder which was believed to 
have caused the trouble. The explanation advanced i s  that the solder flake had caused 
a high-resistance short between the base and collector. Subsequent vibration testing 
then loosened the flake from i t s  shorted position and returned the transistor to normal 
- 17- 
operation. A similar examination of  16 such transistors after testing revealed that 
three had loose solder flakes. Better quality control i s  certainly required in this 
case. 
These are but a very few of the problem areas which are encountered in scientific 
satellite manufacture. They represent areas where the contractors have not exer- 
cised adequate inspection and quality control, primarily because the government 
has been paying a l l  of their costs. Recent contract regulations are aimed at penalizing 
contractors when cost over-runs are permitted to occur. Hopefully now, companies 
engaged in new NASA contracts wi l l  make better utilization of their qualified materials 
and processes personnel at an early and a l l  stages of the contract. 
Conclusion 
T h i s  has been an attempt to describe some of the problems associated with the manu- ' 
facture of scientific satellites, and how the variety of materials and requirements 
.compound these problems. Quality control i s  difficult to maintain because of the lack 
z 
1 
i 
i 
of adequate specifications. And specifications are difficult to write because of a lack 
of details concerning the service requirements. The requirements cannot be exactly 
pinpointed because environmental conditions vary with the spacecrafts' orbital altitude 
and orbit geometry. 
J 
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One definition of quality control states that it i s  a concept which requires that every 
product be checked against established standards to make sure that nothing defective 1 
reaches the consumer. Obviously, as just pointed out, adequate standards are not 
presently available. Does that mean there should be no quality control? Definitely 
not! 
We can practice quality control based upon existing standards, even though not 
adequate, and make improvements as new standards develop. However, quality con- I , 
I 
1 
trol can also be inculcated on every worker's mind, every day, in every American 
plant until Americans again become proud of their handiwork. 
i 
1 
i 
3 
An apropos conclusion to the foregoing are the words of Raymond bewy, famous 1 
5 - - industrial designer: "America i s  engaged in a fight to maintain leadership, not only 
in space, but also in trade, training, goods, and taste. It i s  a fight in which our 
country looses a l i t t le each time any one of us lets his standards fall". 
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Figure 1.  Goddmd Scientific Satellites Which Have Already Been Launched. 
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Figure 2. Goddard Scientific Satellites Recently Launched or Scheduled for 
the Future, 
Figure 3. Echo I I  Full-Size Model During Static Inflation Test. 
Figure 4, Fold Defects in Echo II  Laminate Introduced During Processing, 
Figure 5, Cross-Section of Fold Defect in Echo II Laminate, Imbedded in 
Mounting. 
I -  
i 
Figure 6. Deck Panel Section From OS0 Space-Craft Which Developed 
Cracks at 90' Bends During Vibration Testing. 
, 
Figure 7. Close-up of Cracking in OS0 Deck Panel Pictured in Figure 6. 
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Figure 8. 
by Pressure Welding. ' 
Section of Burst-Tested Titanium Alloy Gas Bottle Manufactured 
Figure 9. Zinc-Silver Battery With Injection Molded Polystyrene Case. 
. '. < . .. 
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Figure 10. View of Polystyrene Battery Case as Seen Through Polariscope 
Showing Residual Stress Pattern. 
Figure 11 , Typical Cadmium-Plated Electrical Connector Used on Spacecraft, 
. 
I 
Figure 12. Cross-Section of Mated Connector Halves Shown in Figure 11, 
Disclosing Space Into Which Metallic Whiskers Can Grow. 
! 
Figure 13. Top Side of Solar Cells. Bright Bands are Contact Strips (Along Edge) 
and Collector Grids. 
a 
Figure 14. Radiograph of Tape Recorder Head. Failures Were in the 2-Mil Dia. 
Wires Connected to the Leads, Seen at the Bottom. 
c 
Figure 15. OGO Horizon Scanner Pivot Showing Broken Cu-Be Flexure Spring. 
Dark Object at Top of Picture i s  Pencil Point. 
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Figure 15. OGO Horizon Scanner Pivot Showing Broken Cu-Be Flexure Spring. 
Dark Object at Top of Picture i s  Pencil Point. 
Figure 16. Hermetically Sealed Transistor, +pica1 of Many Used on Satellites. 
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Figure 17. Interior View of Transistor Seen in Figure 16. 
